Education Policy Analysis Archives  04/11 by Arizona State University & University of South Florida
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
College of Education Publications College of Education
7-24-1996
Education Policy Analysis Archives 04/11
Arizona State University
University of South Florida
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub
Part of the Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Education at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in College
of Education Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Arizona State University and University of South Florida, "Education Policy Analysis Archives 04/11 " (1996). College of Education
Publications. Paper 174.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/coedu_pub/174
1 of 37
Education Policy Analysis Archives
Volume 4 Number 11 July 24, 1996 ISSN 1068-2341
A peer-reviewed scholarly electronic journal.
Editor: Gene V Glass,Glass@ASU.EDU. College of Education,
Arizona State University,Tempe AZ 85287-2411
Copyright 1996, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES.Permission is hereby granted to copy any article
provided that EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES is
credited and copies are not sold.
National Education 'Goals 2000': 
Some Disastrous Unintended Consequences
Robert H. Seidman
New Hampshire College 
(Southern New Hampshire University)
ABSTRACT: "Goals 2000: Educate America Act" aims to, among other things, increase the
high school graduation rate to at least 90% and eliminate the graduation rate gap between
minority and non-minority students. However well intentioned, this goal is doomed to failure.
Powerful systemic forces converge to stabilize the high school graduation rate at about 75%
where it has been since 1965 and where no traditional national policy will be able to advance it
very much. Even if education policy could succeed in increasing the rate to 90% or beyond,
undesirable consequences of potentially great magnitude, especially for the targeted minority
groups, would result.
Goals 2000: Educate America Act
Sec. 102 National Education Goals.
(2) SCHOOL COMPLETION. --(A) By the year 2000, the high 
school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 percent. (B)
The objectives for this goal are that--
(i)the Nation must dramatically reduce its school dropout rate, 
and 75 percent of the students who do drop out will successfully
complete a high school degree or its equivalent; and 
(ii) the gap in high school graduation rates between American
students from minority backgrounds and their non-minority
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counterparts will be eliminated. 
(Public Law 103-227, 1994)
I. Introduction
 The purpose of the "Goals 2000: Educate America Act" is to promote "coherent,
nationwide, systemic education reform." (Public Law 103-227, 20 USC 5801) However well
intentioned such an attempt at reform may be, one aspect is doomed to failure. With respect to
School Completion (Goal 2), legislators and education policy makers ignore the laws and
dynamics of the educational system at their own and our peril.
 The "system of education" is a vast and complex enterprise comprising all of the many and
different ways society educates it citizens. It is useful to distinguish it from the educational
system which possesses a logic and laws of behavior of its own and which can be shown to be
highly intractable to attempts to reform it by education policy. This is particularly true with
regard to "Goals 2000: Educate America Act."
 The theory of the logic and behavior of the educational system illustrates how powerful 
systemic forces converge to stabilize the high school attainment rate at about 75% where it has
been since 1965 and where no traditional national education policy will be able to advance it very
much. Even if education policy could succeed in increasing the rate to 90%, or beyond,
undesirable consequences of potentially great magnitude, especially for the targeted minority
groups, would result.
 One undesirable consequence is economic disaster for those who cannot or choose not to
complete high school. They will be shut out of important non-educational social benefits (e.g.,
good job opportunities) unless alternative routes are opened for them. Another consequence is
the potential reduction of these very same social benefits for those who do complete high school.
A third consequence manifests itself as an unintended, but cruel hoax perpetrated upon the very
minorities the Act seeks to help. By virtue of their being the last identifiable group to attain the
high school diploma in proportion to their numbers in the age cohort, the high school diploma
will not have the same power to secure social goods as it did with previous groups.
 Several policy alternatives are explored: 1) push the high school attainment ratio to 100%
quickly; 2) reduce the high school attainment rate to the 55-60% level; 3) abandon the normative
principle connecting the educational and socioeconomic systems.
Part II presents a brief outline of a comprehensive and general theory of the logic and 
behavior of national educational systems (Green, 1997). Certain of its laws and resulting
dynamics are exposed.
Part III presents a non-causal a priori aggregate model that illustrates certain systemic
dynamics.
Part IV presents an individual probabilistic utility model that extends the aggregate model. 
Both models illustrate systemic theory with respect to the Congressional Act and serve to
locate critical stages in the growth of the educational system where education policy is
most and least effective.
Part V draws conclusions from the analyses of the two models and discusses several
education and non-educational policy alternatives.
Part VI is an analysis of the results of two models from Raymond Boudon which support
the results reported here.
Appendices A and B contain the mathematics of the Individual Utility model. Appendix C
contains the mathematics behind the Aggregate model. Appendix D contains an
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educational attainment table.(Note 1)
II. Theory of the Logic and Behavior of the Educational System
 A student who leaves school in the middle of the school year in one part of the country and
who enters the same grade in a distant part of the country can generally find nearly identical
curricula, procedures and facilities. It appears that some sort of system exists.
 Education policy is after all, policy for the educational system. But what is the educational
system? What are its features? What are the laws of its behavior that set the system in motion?
Answers to these questions can help us to assess the potential impact of the Congressional Act.
Primary Features. The primary features of the educational system are threefold:
The set of schools and colleges, but not all schools and colleges.1.
These schools and colleges within the system are connected by a medium of exchange
which includes those certificates, degrees, diplomas, and the like, that allow one to leave
the Nth level of the system in one locality and enter the Nth level in another. They are all
instruments by which activities carried out in one place can be recognized and "exchanged"
for similar activities of a school or college in some other place. 
Certain schools and colleges will fall outside of the educational system although they will
be within the system of education. Certain proprietary schools may not have their
transcripts and diplomas recognized or accepted at other schools that are within the system.
2.
The schools and colleges that make up the educational system and that are connected by a
medium of exchange are arranged by a principle of sequence: the system of colleges and
schools are organized into levels so that if a person has attained (i.e., completed) level N, 
then he or she has attained level N-1, but not necessarily level N+1.
3.
 This principle allows us to speak of persons progressing through the system and seems to
be a necessary property of any educational system due in part to differing levels of skill
accomplishment, knowledge acquisition and the cognitive development of individuals.
Secondary Features. The system also has certain secondary or derivative elements. They are:
size, a system of control and a distributive function.
Distribution. Every society makes some sort of arrangements for the distribution of its
goods (i.e., benefits). The educational system distributes educational goods such as
knowledge, skills, and certain kinds of taste, amongst others. In addition to these goods,
the system distributes their surrogates, or second-order educational goods such as grades,
diplomas, certificates and the like.
1.
The derivative element of "control" is less relevant for the present analysis than the others. 
It turns out that size is of central import since education policy that is effective for one
stage of systemic growth may be wholly ineffective at another.
2.
System Size. The educational system has eight distinct ways that it can grow (Figure II-1). 
The present analysis focuses upon "growth in attainment" not only because this is what the
Act addresses, but because this mode of growth plays a crucial role in the dynamics of the
system which in turn dooms Goal 2 of the Congressional Act to certain failure. (Note 2)
3.
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Figure II-1. The Modes of Growth
The system may expand in response to increases in the 
school-age population either by increasing the number of
units in the system, or by increasing the number of
students in the units of the system, or both.
1.
Growth in attainment. The system may expand by
increasing rates of attendance and survival.
2.
Vertical Expansion. The system may expand by adding 
levels either at the top or at the bottom.
3.
Horizontal expansion. The system may expand by 
assuming responsibility for educational and social
functions that are either new, that have been ignored, or
that have been carried out by other institutions.
4.
Differentiation. The system may expand either by 
differentiation of programs or institutions or both.
5.
Growth in efficiency. The system may expand by 
intensification, that is, by attempting to do more in the
same time of the same in less time.
6.
The system may expand by extending the school year or 
the school day.
7.
The system may expand by increasing the number of 
persons needed to staff it independently of the number of 
students and number of its units, the magnitiude of the
school-age population, rates of attendance, survival.
8.
(Green, 1997, p. 10)
 There are, however, two more pieces to the system that need to be developed before we
can address the notion of growth and size. One is a normative principle connecting the social
system with the educational system and the other is the systemic Law of Zero Correlation that
relates the strength of the normative principle to system size.
 Normative Principle. It is true that some persons, for whatever reason, will come to
possess a larger share of educational goods than other persons. This may be due to ability
(however it is defined within the system), tenacity, acuity of choice and any number of other
reasons.
 If non-educational social goods such as income, earnings opportunities and status are 
distributed by the socioeconomic system on the basis of the distribution by the educational
system of educational goods (through the instrumentality of second-order educational goods),
then there exists a normative principle that connects the educational and socioeconomic systems.
 This normative principle can be rendered as those having a greater share of educational
goods merit or deserve a greater share of non-educational social goods. See Figure II-2. The
importance and power of this normative principle is, as we shall see, a function of the size of the
educational system as measured by the rate of high school attainment. It varies over different
stages of systemic growth.
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Figure II-2. Normative Principle Components
Educationally 
Relevant Attributes
Such 
as ...
ability, tenacity, acuity of 
choice, and the like
...are linked to...
Educational Benefits Such 
as ...
knowledge, skills, taste, 
manners, standards of civility 
and the like
...are linked to...
Surrogate Benefits Such 
as ...
certificates, diplomas, 
transcripts, licenses, letters of 
recommendation, prestige and
the like
...are linked to...
Non-educational 
Socioeconomic 
Benefits
Such 
as ...
income, employment, 
opportunities, status and the 
like
Law of Zero Correlation. To understand this law, let us posit a uniform growth curve. Suppose
that the educational system grows at a uniform rate over a one hundred year period. That is, there
is a uniform increase (10% each decade) in the proportion of each successive age-cohort attaining
the 12th level of the system. (The actual growth data is shown in Appendix D.)
 When the high school attainment rate is low (e.g., 10% ) the socioeconomic meaning of
high school attainment is likely quite negligible. Employers, all things being equal, would have
little reason to choose a high school graduate over a non-graduate especially when there are so
many of the latter. In the aggregate, high school attainers do not monopolize economic
opportunities simply because of attainment. Thus the strength of the normative principle is low.
To be a high school drop out when most of your age-cohort drops out presents no serious
personal or social problem. See Part A of Figure II-3.
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Figure II.3. Uniform Growth Curve and Social Benefits of Attainment
 As the size of the educational system increases, the power of the normative principle also
increases. Employers now utilize high school attainment as a selection criterion and social goods,
such as status and jobs, begin to be preferentially distributed to high school graduates. See Part B
of Figure II-3.
 However, when the attainment rate reaches 100%, the mere possession of the high school
diploma can have no socioeconomic meaning whatsoever. That is, no social goods can be
distributed on the basis of high school attainment because everyone has the diploma. It is at this
point (and at 0%), that the power of the normative principle is completely destroyed although its
power may be weakened well before this point is reached. See Part C of Figure II-3.
 The Law of Zero Correlation is a logical tautology. See Figure II-4. It is a priori true. For
instance, a society could not distribute any of its goods based upon eye color if everyone had the
same color eyes. The actual shape of this curve and its inflection points is an empirical matter.
However, the models presented here give us some guidance in locating the theoretical inflection
points.
Figure II-4. The Law of Zero Correlation
There is a point of growth of the system at which there is no
longer any correlation between educational attainment and either
the distribution of educationally relevant attributes in the 
population or the distribution of non-educational social goods
associated with educational attainment. 
(Green, 1997, p.91) 
Law of Shifting Benefits and Liabilities. This is one of the many corollaries of the Law of Zero
Correlation. This corollary assures that high school attainment will have a declining social value
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and that concomitantly, failure to attain the high school diploma will have an increasing social
liability, as the attainment rate moves toward the 100% zero correlation point. Thus, as zero
correlation is approached, the aggregate social benefits of the attainment group and the aggregate
liabilities of non-attainment both increase (Figures II-3 and II-5)
 On the liability side, where school leaving was once a possible and viable alternative, it
now becomes an evil to be avoided at all costs. These shifting benefits and liabilities make high
school attendance and attainment "compulsory" in ways that were surely never meant to be. The
personal and social consequences of dropping out of high school can be devastating.
 The Law of Shifting Benefits and Liabilities does not specify the points in systemic growth
(Sections A, B and C in Figures II-3 and II-5) where the benefits and liabilities of high school
attainment shift. However, the two models presented in Parts III and IV do show that when 55%
of the 17 year-old age-cohort attains the high school diploma, that group will receive the greater
share of social benefits due to the moderate power of the normative principle.
Figure II-5. Shifting Liabilities of Non-Attainment
 At this point in the growth of the educational system, high school attainment is efficacious 
in obtaining a disproportionate share of social goods. Thus, a high school diploma becomes a
highly sought after good. This corresponds, in the actual growth of the system, to the year 1948.
(See Appendix D)
 In addition, the models show that when the system becomes fairly large (i.e., 76% high
school attainment in 1965), the power of this normative principle begins to decrease even though,
historically, the personal and social belief in it remains high. This is prior to zero correlation
setting in and may explain why the system has stabilized at around 75% attainment and why it
has been so resistant to attemps at education reform.
 This is also the point at which the liabilities of non-attainment appear to increase 
dramatically and where the "drop out problem" became, politically, a problem to be dealt with.
Figure II-6 shows the combined effects of the Law of Shifting Benefits and Liabilities and
exposes a peculiar paradox: as zero correlation is approached, the aggregate social benefits once
associated with high school attainment decline and the associated social liabilities of
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non-attainment increase.
Figure II-6. Shifting Benefits and Liabilities of Attainment
 If one posits that Section C of Figure II-6 represents the part of the growth of the system
where the effects of these laws are maximally felt, then what would befall the minorities that the
Congressional Act seeks to help? To address this question, consider two more systemic
principles: the Law of Last Entry and the Principle of the Moving Target. These two principles
speak to the "Goals 2000" goal of closing the attainment gap (and presumably, the social benefits
gap) between minorities and non-minority students.
 The Law of Last Entry states that "as we approach the point of universal attainment at any 
level of the system, the last group to enter and complete that level will be drawn from lower
socioeconomic groups." See Figure II-7. However, unlike the Law of Zero Correlation, this law
is neither tautological nor a priori, but can be considered to be an empirical generalization. The
basis for this claim is given in much more detail elsewhere (Green, 1997).
Figure II-7. The Law of Last Entry
It appears to be true that no society has been able to expand its
total educational enterprise to include the lower status groups in
proportion to their numbers in the population until the system is
"saturated" by the upper and middle status groups. 
(Green, 1997, p.108) 
 A corollary of the Law of Last Entry is the Principle of the Moving Target, which states 
that as the group of last entry reaches its target of proportional 12th grade attainment rate, the
target will shift. Note, that if the group of last entry pushes the attainment rate to 100%, then the
high school diploma cannot, in and of itself, be used to distribute social benefits to anyone, much
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less to this last group. Zero correlation will have set in and the target will have shifted to
attaining a higher level of the educational system: post-secondary.
 However, even if the attainment rate does not reach 100% with the group of last entry (in
this case, minority groups), this group will still not reap the same benefits of the high school
diploma that previous groups reaped due to the Law of Shifting Benefits and Liabilities. The
point in the attainment growth where this occurs is an empirical point. However, the models
presented in this paper give us some theoretical guidance.
 "Goals 2000" seeks to set and carry out a national policy to increase the high school 
attainment rate from its present level to at least 90%. If the rate stays below 100%, zero
correlation would be avoided. I contend, however, that the effects of merely approaching zero
correlation will be felt well before the 90% attainment level is reached (if it ever could be
reached!). As the theoretical models which follow show, the felt effect could be one reason why
the attainment rate has stabilized for so long at about 75%. Empirical confirmation can be found
in (Green, 1997).
III. THE AGGREGATE MODEL AND APPLICATIONS
A. The Model The following Aggregate Model rests upon three idealized assumptions:
Non-educational social benefits are always normally distributed in the population under
consideration and remain so over time - a change in the high school attainment ratio does
not affect the overall normal shape of this distribution;
1.
This distribution encompasses those who have attained the high school diploma, but who
have not gone on in formal schooling (attainers), and those who have not attained the high
school diploma (non-attainers);
2.
Society allocates its social benefits in such a way that the attainers monopolize the upper
end of the normal distribution.
3.
 The first assumption fixes the overall shape of the distribution and offers a particular view 
of distributed justice. This distribution can be thought to reflect some overall normally
distributed attribute or attributes in the total population under consideration. The second and
third assumptions tell us that the high school attainers can be found, as a group, lumped at the
upper end of the distribution. The third assumption, which admittedly represents an overly rigid
meritocratic society, will be altered in the model presented in Part IV,
 These three assumptions are realized in Figure III-2, which is a normal distribution in
standardized normal form having a grand median (µ) of zero and a standard deviation (ó) of one.
Each asymptote is truncated, for computational purposes, at 3.9 standard deviations from the
mean. The high school attainment ratio Ø is represented by the shaded area under the curve. This
is the proportion of the total population under consideration that has attained the high school
diploma. The median value of the social benefits of this group is µ(Ø).
 The unshaded portion under the curve is the proportion of the total population that has not
attained the high school degree (~Ø) and is equal to (1- Ø). The median value of the social
benefit for this group is µ(~Ø).
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Figure III-1. Standardized Normal Curve for the Distribution of Social Benefits (Ø = high school attainment
ratio; ~Ø = non-attainment ratio; µ = grand median = 0; µ(Ø)= median social benefit for attainer group;
µ(~Ø) = median social benefit for non-attainer group; standard deviation = 1)
Table III-1
Median Social Benefits, Their Differences, and Their Rates of Change For
Attainer and Non-attainer Groups by High School Attainment Ratio
(1)
Size of
Attainment
Group: Ø
(2)
Attainer 
Median:µ(Ø)
(3)
Non-Attainer
Group
Median:µ(~Ø)
(4)
µ(Ø) - µ(~Ø)
(5)
Rate of
Change of
µ(Ø)
(6)
Rate of 
Change of
µ(~Ø)
0.01 2.575 -0.012 2.587 . .
0.05 1.960 -0.063 2.023 0.2388 4.2500
0.10 1.645 -0.126 1.771 0.1607 1.0000
0.15 1.440 -0.189 1.629 0.1246 0.5000
0.20 1.283 -0.253 1.536 0.1090 0.3386
0.25 1.150 -0.319 1.469 0.1037 0.2609
0.30 1.037 -0.385 1.422 0.0983 0.2069
0.35 0.935 -0.454 1.389 0.0984 0.1792
0.40 0.842 -0.524 1.366 0.0995 0.1542
0.45 0.755 -0.598 1.353 0.1033 0.1412
0.50 0.675 -0.675 1.350 0.1060 0.1288
0.55 0.598 -0.755 1.353 0.1141 0.1185
0.60 0.524 -0.842 1.366 0.1237 0.1152
0.65 0.454 -0.935 1.389 0.1336 0.1105
0.70 0.385 -1.037 1.422 0.1520 0.1091
0.75 0.319 -1.150 1.469 0.1714 0.1090
0.80 0.253 -1.283 1.536 0.2069 0.1157
0.85 0.189 -1.440 1.629 0.2530 0.1224
0.90 0.126 -1.645 1.771 0.3333 0.1424
0.95 0.063 -1.960 2.023 0.5000 0.1915
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0.99 0.012 -2.575 2.587 0.8095 0.3138
 Note that the attainer and non-attainer medians change as a function of the attainment
ratio. When the ratio (Ø) is zero, the non-attainer median is equal to the grand median. When the
ratio approaches its limit of one, the attainer median approaches the grand median and the
non-attainer median approaches -3.9 standard deviations from the grand median. We can easily
calculate the values of the attainer and non-attainer medians for different values of the attainment
ratio.(Note 3) Table III-1 shows their values, their differences and their rates of change for
attainment ratios ranging from 0.01 to 0.99. Figure III-2 is a plot of the attainer and non-attainer
medians by the attainment ratio.
Figure III-2. Median Social Benefit of Attainer Group (µ(Ø)) and Non-Attainer Group
(µ(~Ø)) by High School Attainment Ratio (%) (Ø) (from Table III-1, Columns 2 and 3)
B. An Income Disparity Analysis
 A conventional analysis of high school attainer and non-attainer income disparities
considers whatever is gained by the attainers to be the magnitude of the liability experienced by
the non-attainers. If, for example, the median income of the attainer group is 150% of the
non-attainer median income (at a particular attainment ratio), then the benefit to the former group
is 50% while the liability to the latter group (in foregone income and earnings opportunities, etc.)
is 50%. This approach tends to conceal the full impact of the shifting benefits and liabilities of
educational attainment.
 Table III-1 and Figure III-1 display another approach to this situation. Here we find the
difference between the median benefit of the attainer group and the median benefit of the entire
population under consideration (Table III-1, column 2). We do the same for the non-attainer
group (Table III-1, column 3). The difference between these two grand-median-dispersions is a
measure of the relative position of one group with respect to the other (Table III-1, column 4).
 If we think of such social benefits as income, salary and wages, then a conventional supply
and demand analysis suggests that as the supply of high school graduates increases, the relative
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social benefits realized by these graduates, with respect to those with no high school degree, will
decline (given a constant market demand for attainers). This is just what happens in the
Aggregate Model as the attainment ratio grows from 0.01 to 0.50. However, as the attainment
ratio exceeds 50%, the relative advantage of the attainers over the non-attainers increases.(Note
4) See Figure III-2.
 These latter results of the model are consistent with certain empirical findings. Time-series
U.S. Census data for 18-year-old to 24-year-old males from 1939 (when the national high school
attainment ratio was 50%) to 1990 display this phenomenon. (Note 5) A U.S. Senate report
which examined the incomes of 24- to 34-year-old males expressed surprise at the "paradox" of
increasing relative income for high school attainers over non-attainers. (Note 6)
 The interaction between the Law of Zero Correlation and the Law of Shifting Benefits and
Liabilities has certain explanatory power when the data are examined as illustrated in the
Aggregate Model. The "paradox," cited above, evaporates in light of these systemic dynamics
which show the declining benefits associated with attainment and the increasing liabilities
associated with non-attainment as the zero correlation point is approached. (Note 7)
C. Stabilization of the High School Attainment Ratio
 What is the meaning of the "intersection" of the benefit and liability curves in Figure II-6?
Although the two curves do not actually intersect (they have different vertical axes), the
"intersection" shown in Figure II-6 does illustrate certain interactive systemic effects. This
"intersection" can be viewed as an equilibrium point in the growth of the system beyond which it
no longer pays (in aggregate social benefit terms) to finish high school but is quite a serious
social disaster not to do so. In a way, it is an aggregate recognition of the Law of Zero
Correlation and the Law of Shifting Benefits and Liabilities. This phenomenon is illustrated by
the Aggregate Model.
 Figure III-3 is a plot of the rate of decline of the social benefits of attainment generated by 
the model. Note that after an attainment ratio of 0.20 the median value declines at a fairly
constant rate until the high school attainment ratio reaches 50%. At this point in the growth of the
educational system, the rate of decline increases and increases sharply at 75% attainment.
High School Attainment Ratio
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Figure III-3. Rate of Change of Attainer Group Median (Ordinate) by High School
Attainment Ratio (%) (from Table III-1, Column 5)
Figure III-4 is a plot of the rate of decline of the non-attainer median. Here the median declines at
a decreasing rate until 75% attainment at which point the rate begins to increase and then
increases sharply at 80% attainment.
Figure III-4. Rate of Change of Non-Attainer Group Median by High School Attainment
Ratio (from Table III-1, Column 6)
 Thus, the two curves shown in Figure III-2 can be said to contain inflection points which 
occur in the growth of the system where the high school attainment ratio is about 75%. The
stabilization of the national attainment ratio at around 75% may be the social recognition of the
phenomenon described by the model.(Note 8)
 Is it purely coincidental that the inflection points in the model occur where the national
high school attainment ratio has stabilized: at about 75%? Nevertheless, the model does serve to
illustrate the phenomenon of systemic "equilibrium" reflecting the interactive dynamics between
certain systemic laws. The interaction between these laws offers an account of certain systemic
phenomena.
 The behavior of the educational system described above is based upon these systemic
features: the Principle of Sequence, the distribution of second-order educational goods and the
size of the system as measured by the attainment ratio at the twelfth level. Systemic behavior was
driven by the power of a logical tautology, its corollary and a normative principle linking the
educational and social systems. It is ironic that the "successful" growth of the system, as
measured by an increasing high school attainment ratio, appears to sow the seeds of a particularly
harsh and peculiar brand of failure. (Note 9)
IV. THE PROBABILISTIC UTILITY MODEL
14 of 37
 The idealized society reflected in the three assumptions underlying the Aggregate Model is
a rigidly meritocratic one. By altering the first and third assumptions, (see Section III-A), we can
build a model that reflects a society that distributes its non-educational social goods in a
somewhat more flexible manner.
 Like the Aggregate Model, let us assume that the population under consideration is 
dichotomized into those who have attained the high school diploma (and nothing beyond it) and
those who have not attained the degree. Furthermore, let us assume two independent normal
distributions of social goods, one for the attainment group and the other for the non-attainment
group. This state of affairs is illustrated in Figure IV-1.
 Now let us assume that both of these normal distributions have identical standard
deviations. Thus, we can normalize each of the distributions and leave them superimposed, one
upon the other, on the social benefits axis. Note that the relative position of the two normal curve
means remains unaffected by the standardization (i.e., the standardized and unstandardized
means remain stationary). These standardized distributions are shown in Figure IV-1.
A. The Standardized Normal Distributions
Consider the two standardized normal distributions shown in Figure IV-1. Let curves X(Ø) and
X(~Ø) represent the distributions of earnings opportunities of high school attainers and
non-attainers, respectively. Both curves have their asymptotes truncated, to facilitate the
computations to follow, at 3.0 standard deviations above and below their respective means of
zero and are superimposed upon a common axis, X, showing an apparent overlap area, E: that
area under both curves which has a common X-axis range.
Figure IV-1. Two Overlapping Standardized Normal Curves
 We let Ø stand for the ratio of high school attainers to the total population under
consideration and let ß stand for the meritocratic parameter. This parameter represents those in
the total population, and in particular that proportion of distribution X(Ø) , which monopolizes
the highest values of X. It is clear from Figure IV-1 that this parameter imposes an upper-bound
on the range of distribution X(~Ø) (i.e., I(A)) and concomitantly places a lower-bound on the
range of X(Ø) (i.e., I(D)). Except where ß = 0, the ranges of X(Ø) and X(~Ø) differ.
 Let us assume that despite changes in the size of Ø, the original non-standardized normal
distributions retain their normal shapes and continue to have identical standard deviations and
unchanged means. The X(Ø) mean remains forever fixed and thus for any given Ø , only a
change in ß can shift the X(~Ø) curve. A mean/medium analysis of these curves is presented in
Appendix B.
 Unlike the Aggregate Model, individuals in X(Ø) (i.e., high school attainers) are no longer
guaranteed an advantage over persons in X(~Ø) (i.e., non-attainers), with respect to some value
of X (level of social benefit). The question now shifts from one of absolute advantage (as in the
Aggregate Model) to one of relative advantage. We now ask, what is the probability that an
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individual will be advantaged with respect to X, over changes in Ø and in ß?
The symbols in Figure IV-1 refer to proportions and are explained in Table IV-1, below.
Table IV-1
PROPORTIONAL VALUES OF SECTIONS IN FIGURE IV-1
Section Symbol Meaning
A ß
The proportion of the population 
which is in X(Ø) and which
monopolizes the highest X values.
This is the value of the meritocratic
parameter.
B 1- ß
The proportion of the population 
which is in X(Ø) and which does not
monopolize the highest X values.
C 1- ß
The proportion of the population 
which is in X(~Ø) and which is not
relegated to the lowest X values.
D ß
The proportion of the population 
which is in X(~Ø) and is relegated to
the lowest X values.
E Þ The area of "intersection" of Section B of X(Ø) and Section C of X(~Ø).
 The above conceptualization allows us to calculate the probabilities of persons falling in
any of the five sections of Figure IV-1 as a function of ß and Ø. These probabilities are
conditional probabilities of independent events. Table IV-2 gives the formulae for these
calculations.
Table IV-2 
PROBABILITIES
Section Probability Meaning
A Pr(A|X(Ø))=ßØ
The probability of residing in
Section A is the conditional
probability of residing in A given
that one already resides in X(Ø).
B Pr(B|X(Ø))=(1- ß)Ø
The probability of residing in
Section B is the conditional
probability of not residing in A
given that one resides in X(Ø).
C Pr(C|X(~Ø))=(1-ß)(1- Ø)
The probability of residing in 
Section C is the conditional
probability of not residing in D
given that one resides in X(~Ø).
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D Pr(D|X(~Ø))=ß(1- Ø)
The probability of residing in 
Section D is the conditional
probability of residing in D given
that one resides in X(~Ø).
E1 Pr(E|C|X(~Ø))=(1- ß)(1-Ø)Þ
The probability of residing in
Section E given that one is
already in X(Ø) , is the
conditional probability of 
residing in E (i.e., Þ) given that
one resides in X(~Ø) and resides
in Section C.
E2 Pr(E|B|X(Ø))=(1- ß)ØÞ
The probability of residing in
Section E given that one is
already in X(Ø) is the conditional
probability of residing in E given
that one resides in X(Ø) and
resides in B .
B. Interpretation of Area E
 The move from proportions in Table IV-1 to probabilities in Table IV-2 is a crucial one.
Recall that each distribution represents one part of the dichotomized total population under
consideration. The overlapping area E, is not a shared population between the two groups. It
simply illustrates the common range of X shared by area B in X(Ø) and C in X(~Ø).
 Each person in the total population under consideration has a probability of ending up in 
one of the two distributions. Since Ø is the proportion of the total population that has attained the
twelfth level, any individual has probability Ø of falling under distribution X(Ø) (all other things
being equal). Similarly, the probability of not attaining at level 12 is equal to (1- Ø). Of course, Ø
+ (1- Ø) equals 1.0, which is the total population under consideration. All of this follows from
the laws of proportions.
 Consider Figure IV-1. As Section A changes in size, X(~Ø) shifts to the left or to the right
(recall that we have assumed that changes in Ø do not affect the shape or position of the
distributions). The entire area under any one of the two distributions is equal to 1.0. Thus, if ß
represents the value of the area of Section A, then 1- ß is the area of Section B. From this we can
see that the conditional probability of an individual being an attainer and being a monopolizer of
the higher values of X is ßØ.
 The laws of symmetry make Section D equal to Section A. Thus, the probability of an
individual being a non-attainer and being relegated to the lowest values of X is ß(1- Ø). Similar
arguments can be made for Sections B and C. The probabilistic interpretation of Section E is a
more complicated matter, however.
 Although Sections B and C do not actually have an area in common, they do share the
common X-axis range, I(D) to I(A). It is useful to think of Section E as if it is the area of overlap
between the two distributions. Recall that the probability of being in C is simply (1-Ø)(1-ß).
Now, the probability of being in C and at the same time being within the scope of distribution
X(Ø) is just the probability of being in C times the area of Section E. Similarly, the probability of
being in B is (1- ß)Ø. The probability of being in B and within the scope of distribution X(~Ø) is
just the probability of being in B times the area of Section E.
 It should now be clear that Pr(E|C|X(~Ø)) is the probability of any individual non-attainer
falling in the same range with and being under the same scope as an attainer. Likewise,
Pr(E|B|X(Ø)) is the probability of any individual attainer falling in the same range with and being
under the same scope as a non-attainer. These two probabilities need not always be equal. In fact,
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they are equal only when Ø = 0.50.
 What remains is to calculate the area of Section E (i.e.,Þ). This is done in Appendix A.
C. Results of the Analysis
 Tables IV-3 and IV-4 give the probabilities of falling in Section E given attainment and of
falling in Section E given non-attainment, respectively. These Tables are derived from the
probability formulae in Table IV-2. To obtain the probabilistic marginal utilities of attainment,
we simply perform a matrix subtraction, Table IV-4 minus Table IV-3. The results of this
subtraction are shown in Table IV-5.
 Note that the marginal utilities decrease for constant Ø and increasing ß, and decrease for
constant ß and increasing Ø. Furthermore, each column, reflects about the row where Ø = 0.50 so
that each column below this row is the negative converse of the column above.
 An inspection of Table IV-5 shows that it is not individually advantageous to obtain the
high school diploma until 55% of the population under consideration (17-year old age cohort)
does so. The row where Ø =0.50 can be considered to be the indifference level. However, a
mean/median analysis shows that, in the aggregate, it is always advantageous to be an attainer
rather than a non-attainer. This is so because for all values of ß, µ(Ø) is greater than µ(~Ø)
(except when they are equal, when ß = 0). A complete mean/median analysis is given in
Appendix B. See columns 4 and 6 in Table B-1.
 This analysis of the Probabilistic Utility Model exposes an interesting paradox: in the
aggregate it is more advantageous to be an attainer no matter what Ø and ß are; individually this
is not always the case. Furthermore, Table IV-5 indicates that the marginal disutility of not
attaining the high school degree increases as attainment increases and also increases as the
meritocratic parameter decreases! This phenomenon can be vividly seen in the lower left-hand
quadrant of Table IV-5.
 This quadrant corresponds to the decreasing power of the normative principle as the
attainment rate increases toward 100%. As we move from the upper right-hand to the lower
left-hand corner on the quandrant diagonal, disutilities can be seen to double, triple and even
quadruple at various steps.
Table IV-3
PROBABILITY OF FALLING IN SECTION E GIVEN ATTAINMENT OF LEVEL 12
Meritocratic Parameter (ß)
* 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95
0.01 0.0035 0.0022 0.0015 0.0010 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
0.05 0.0176 0.0112 0.0076 0.0051 0.0033 0.0021 0.0012 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001
0.10 0.0353 0.0224 0.0152 0.0101 0.0067 0.0042 0.0023 0.0011 0.0003 0.0001
0.15 0.0529 0.0336 0.0228 0.0152 0.0100 0.0062 0.0035 0.0016 0.0005 0.0002
0.20 0.0706 0.0448 0.0304 0.0203 0.0134 0.0083 0.0047 0.0022 0.0006 0.0002
0.25 0.0882 0.0560 0.0380 0.0254 0.0167 0.0104 0.0058 0.0027 0.0008 0.0003
0.30 0.1058 0.0672 0.0456 0.0304 0.0200 0.0125 0.0070 0.0033 0.0010 0.0003
0.35 0.1235 0.0785 0.0532 0.0355 0.0234 0.0146 0.0082 0.0038 0.0011 0.0004
0.40 0.1411 0.0897 0.0608 0.0406 0.0267 0.0166 0.0094 0.0044 0.0013 0.0004
0.45 0.1588 0.1009 0.0684 0.0456 0.0301 0.0187 0.0105 0.0049 0.0014 0.0005
0.50 0.1764 0.1121 0.0759 0.0507 0.0334 0.0208 0.0117 0.0055 0.0016 0.0005
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0.55 0.1940 0.1233 0.0835 0.0558 0.0367 0.0229 0.0129 0.0060 0.0018 0.0006
0.60 0.2117 0.1345 0.0911 0.0608 0.0401 0.0250 0.0140 0.0066 0.0019 0.0006
0.65 0.2293 0.1457 0.0987 0.0659 0.0434 0.0270 0.0152 0.0071 0.0021 0.0007
0.70 0.2470 0.1569 0.1063 0.0710 0.0468 0.0291 0.0164 0.0077 0.0023 0.0007
0.75 0.2646 0.1681 0.1139 0.0760 0.0501 0.0312 0.0176 0.0082 0.0024 0.0008
0.80 0.2822 0.1793 0.1215 0.0811 0.0534 0.0333 0.0187 0.0088 0.0026 0.0008
0.85 0.2999 0.1905 0.1291 0.0862 0.0568 0.0354 0.0199 0.0093 0.0027 0.0009
0.90 0.3175 0.2017 0.1367 0.0913 0.0601 0.0374 0.0211 0.0099 0.0029 0.0009
0.95 0.3352 0.2130 0.1443 0.0963 0.0635 0.0395 0.0222 0.0104 0.0031 0.0010
* Proportion of 12th Level Attainers
Table IV-4
PROBABILITY OF FALLING IN SECTION E GIVEN ATTAINMENT BELOW LEVEL 12
Meritocratic Parameter (ß)
* 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95
0.01 0.3493 0.2219 0.1504 0.1004 0.0661 0.0412 0.0232 0.0109 0.0032 0.0010
0.05 0.3352 0.2130 0.1443 0.0963 0.0635 0.0395 0.0222 0.0104 0.0031 0.0010
0.10 0.3175 0.2017 0.1367 0.0913 0.0601 0.0374 0.0211 0.0099 0.0029 0.0009
0.15 0.2999 0.1905 0.1291 0.0862 0.0568 0.0354 0.0199 0.0093 0.0027 0.0009
0.20 0.2822 0.1793 0.1215 0.0811 0.0534 0.0333 0.0187 0.0088 0.0026 0.0008
0.25 0.2646 0.1681 0.1139 0.0760 0.0501 0.0312 0.0176 0.0082 0.0024 0.0008
0.30 0.2470 0.1569 0.1063 0.0710 0.0468 0.0291 0.0164 0.0077 0.0023 0.0007
0.35 0.2293 0.1457 0.0987 0.0659 0.0434 0.0270 0.0152 0.0071 0.0021 0.0007
0.40 0.2117 0.1345 0.0911 0.0608 0.0401 0.0250 0.0140 0.0066 0.0019 0.0006
0.45 0.1940 0.1233 0.0835 0.0558 0.0367 0.0229 0.0129 0.0060 0.0018 0.0006
0.50 0.1764 0.1121 0.0759 0.0507 0.0334 0.0208 0.0117 0.0055 0.0016 0.0005
0.55 0.1588 0.1009 0.0684 0.0456 0.0301 0.0187 0.0105 0.0049 0.0014 0.0005
0.60 0.1411 0.0897 0.0608 0.0406 0.0267 0.0166 0.0094 0.0044 0.0013 0.0004
0.65 0.1235 0.0785 0.0532 0.0355 0.0234 0.0146 0.0082 0.0038 0.0011 0.0004
0.70 0.1058 0.0672 0.0456 0.0304 0.0200 0.0125 0.0070 0.0033 0.0010 0.0003
0.75 0.0882 0.0560 0.0380 0.0254 0.0167 0.0104 0.0058 0.0027 0.0008 0.0003
0.80 0.0706 0.0448 0.0304 0.0203 0.0134 0.0003 0.0047 0.0022 0.0006 0.0002
0.85 0.0529 0.0336 0.0228 0.0152 0.0100 0.0062 0.0035 0.0016 0.0005 0.0002
0.90 0.0353 0.0224 0.0152 0.0101 0.0067 0.0042 0.0023 0.0011 0.0003 0.0001
0.95 0.0176 0.0112 0.0076 0.0051 0.0033 0.0021 0.0012 0.0050 0.0002 0.0001
* Proportion of 12th Level Attainers
Table IV-5
PROBABILISTIC MARGINAL UTILITIES OF ATTAINMENT OF LEVEL 12
Meritocratic Parameter (ß)
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* 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95
0.01 0.3460 0.2200 0.1490 0.0990 0.0650 0.0410 0.0230 0.0110 0.0030 0.0010
0.05 0.3180 0.2020 0.1370 0.0910 0.0600 0.0370 0.0210 0.0100 0.0030 0.0010
0.10 0.2820 0.1790 0.1220 0.0810 0.0530 0.0330 0.0190 0.0090 0.0030 0.0010
0.15 0.2470 0.1570 0.1060 0.0710 0.0470 0.0290 0.0160 0.0080 0.0020 0.0010
0.20 0.2120 0.1340 0.0910 0.0610 0.0400 0.0250 0.0140 0.0070 0.0020 0.0010
0.25 0.1760 0.1120 0.0760 0.0510 0.0330 0.0210 0.0120 0.0050 0.0020 0.0010
0.30 0.1410 0.0900 0.0610 0.0410 0.0270 0.0170 0.0090 0.0040 0.0010 0.0000
0.35 0.1060 0.0670 0.0460 0.0300 0.0200 0.0120 0.0070 0.0030 0.0010 0.0000
0.40 0.0710 0.0450 0.0300 0.0200 0.0130 0.0080 0.0050 0.0020 0.0010 0.0000
0.45 0.0350 0.0220 0.0150 0.0100 0.0070 0.0040 0.0020 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
0.50 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.55 -0.0350 -0.0220 -0.0150 -0.0100 -0.0070 -0.0040 -0.0020 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
0.60 -0.0710 -0.0450 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0130 -0.0080 -0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0010 0.0000
0.65 -0.1060 -0.0670 -0.0460 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0120 -0.0070 -0.0030 -0.0010 0.0000
0.70 -0.1410 -0.0900 -0.0610 -0.0410 -0.0270 -0.0170 -0.0090 -0.0040 -0.0010 0.0000
0.75 -0.1760 -0.1120 -0.0760 -0.0510 -0.0330 -0.0210 -0.0120 -0.0050 -0.0020 -0.0010
0.80 -0.2120 -0.1340 -0.0910 -0.0610 -0.0400 -0.0250 -0.0140 -0.0070 -0.0020 -0.0010
0.85 -0.2470 -0.1570 -0.1060 -0.0710 -0.0470 -0.0290 -0.0160 -0.0080 -0.0020 -0.0010
0.90 -0.2820 -0.1790 -0.1220 -0.0810 -0.0530 -0.0330 -0.0190 -0.0090 -0.0030 -0.0010
0.95 -0.3180 -0.2020 -0.1370 -0.0910 -0.0600 -0.0370 -0.0210 -0.0100 -0.0030 -0.0010
* Proportion of 12th Level Attainers
V. RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, CONJECTURES and POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES
 These models illustrate the theoretical limitations of education policy designed to increase 
the high school attainment rate to 90% or above and to help minorities share in the "benefits" of
educational attainment. They are formal models and are not grounded in empirical results. Like
Raymond Boudon's models (see Part VI), they avoid the cross-sectional and variable
confounding of survey data. They illustrate the power of a logical tautology in conjunction with a
normative principle. However, these idealized models are not without limitations
 The Aggregate Model seems, on the face of it, too meritocratic for our present society. The
distribution of social benefits may not in reality, be normal and their means (as shown in the
Utility Model) may not remain constant with systemic growth (which is clearly not the case in the
Aggregate Model). Nonetheless, these models can serve as "benchmarks" against which to
compare other logico-mathematical models containing different assumptions, and still others
based upon empirically derived data. They also add to our database of models.
Policy Alternatives. The results of the models developed in this analysis suggest a number of
possible alternative education policy scenarios. Three such follow.
Push the High School Attainment Rate to 100% quickly.
20 of 37
Given that attempts to reduce social inequalities by increasing the national high school
attainment ratio will fail, what would be the consequences of entirely eliminating
educational attainment inequality at the high school level? That is, push the high school
attainment rate to 100% so that the high school diploma can no longer be the basis for the
distribution of non-educational social goods. 
This approach has two major pitfalls. First, the system had better reach 100% attainment
very quickly so as to minimize the hardships that will have to be endured by the ever
decreasing percentage of non-attainers. Second, even if such a result could be achieved, the
original inequality problems would remain unsolved since the problems would merely be
shifted to the next higher level of the educational system - postsecondary. 
If the normative principle persists (and there is no reason to assume that it will not) then
the distributional instrument of social goods will shift to the postsecondary level. This
level is, for the most part, selective. One does not only choose to go on, one is chosen.
Thus, enormous pressures will come to bear upon this level to alter its selectivity feature.
One can argue that this pressure is already fairly strong.
Reduce the High School Attainment Rate to the 55-60% Level.
This level is below the "equilibrium point" of the Aggregate Model and close to the
"indifference" level of the utility model. This is the point at which the effects of the decline
in the social benefits of attainment and the precipitous rise in the social liabilities of
non-attainment are (theoretically) thought to begin. 
Of course, careful consideration needs to be given to the provision of ample opportunities
for all to continue their education (i.e., pursue learning). Such a policy must avoid an
inequitable distribution of the non-attainers based on educationally irrelevant attributes
such as race, class and ethnic background. Admittedly, a policy of this sort would not
enjoy widespread political support.
Abandon the Normative Principle. The two previous alternatives assumed the continued
presence of the normative principle. But what would life be like without it? The 
abandonment of this principle might be the most efficacious, but a politically and socially
difficult, way to reduce educational and socioeconomic inequality. 
If educational attainment is no longer used as an instrument for the distribution of
non-educational social goods, then perhaps education could once again be pursued for the
benefits that are intrinsic in the educational goods themselves and not for the
socioeconomic advantages that disappear and reappear with ever increasing rates and
different levels of attainment. 
Such a move might signal the end of the illusion that the educational system is a solution
to practically every social ill. I do not claim to know just what new instruments for the
distribution of social benefits would arise, nor how one could go about judging their
desirability as a replacement for educational attainment. However, a reconsideration of the
socioeconomic normative principle that disproportionately rewards formal educational
attainment might prove to be a beneficial exercise.
VI. ANALYTICAL POSTSCRIPT: BOUDON'S MODELS OF
INEQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL and SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY
 Two models created by the French Sociologist, Raymond Boudon (Boudon, 1974) support
the results of the two models presented here. Boudon's models are of inequality of educational
opportunity (IEO) and inequality of social opportunity (ISO). He analyses their relationship to
one another and to the educational and social systems. Some of Boudon's relevant results and
analyses follow.
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A. Boudon's IEO and ISO Models and the Theory of Educational Systems
 Boudon's models and his analyses are highly suggestive in many ways. In addition to a
methodological approach which avoids some of the pitfalls of factorial analysis (i.e., partial
accounting for total variance, cross-sectional "illusions," and lack of quantitatively adequate
data), Boudon adds an important dimension to the description of the normative behavior of the
type of educational system spawned in Western industrial societies. This dimension, system
animation, is of fundamental import in helping to provide a clear and precise picture of the
dynamics of systemic motion.
 By observing (and modeling) the over-time cumulative effects of the various factors 
affecting the educational system's growth, Boudon is able to discern the logical limits and
consequences of this growth. The ceiling-effect and the exponential mechanism that combine to
drive the IEO model help generate a number of observations and paradoxes that bear
significantly upon the theory of educational systems as presented here.
Some Familiar Paradoxes
 One of the most striking paradoxes generated by Boudon's models is that "other things
being equal" (which is seldom the case), educational growth has the effect of increasing social
and economic inequality. This happens even when the system becomes more egalitarian with
respect to educational opportunity (EO).
 This paradox rests upon the assumption that income is dependent upon educational
attainment level. Over time, educational level and socioeconomic status increase with
educational level increasing more rapidly the higher the socioeconomic level. Since both of these
factors are "independently" responsible for income differentials, "economic inequality will
increase over time along with social inequality, for the latter is correlated with the former."
(Boudon, 1974, pg. 188)
 The paradox is completed when we add another important conclusion reached by the
application of Boudon's model: change in social stratification is the only factor that can
substantially affect the model's exponential mechanism and hence ISO. This leads Boudon to
conclude that educational growth can partially explain the "persistence of economic inequality in
Western societies." (ibid., 188) It is quite remarkable that Boudon's model and the models
pesented here reach identical conclusions using such different but complementary methods.
The Success-Breeds-Futility Paradox
 Another paradox illustrates just how the apparent success of the educational system leads
to futility for some participants and how the system fuels the fires of its own expansion. Boudon's
models indicate that one of the main endogenous factors responsible for the increase in
educational demand is the over-time change in the status expectations of individuals with respect
to educational level.
...as time goes on, the structure of expectations associated with the two highest
levels of education is constant; intermediate levels are affected most adversely; the
structure of expectations relating to the lowest levels of education becomes less
favorable, too, but it is less influenced by the overall educational increase than are
the intermediary levels. (ibid., 149)
Thus, as IEO decreases over time and the educational system expands at all levels, the social
status expectations for persons at intermediate educational levels decrease and these persons
must raise their levels just to maintain constant social status expectations. This treadmill effect
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means that while the relation between educational level and social status changes very little over
time, the number of years of schooling associated with each of the educational levels increases.
 Thus, while the average level of educational attainment in the population increases, the
educational levels that are associated with particular status expectations are "simultaneously
moving upward." As individuals demand more and more education over time, the individual
return tends to be nil, while the aggregate return on this demand is high. The lower
socioeconomic classes are compelled to demand more education (especially if the higher classes
to do), for not to do so condemns these lower classes to constantly falling social status
expectations. However, more educational demand only retards this diminution in status and does
not increase the lower class's chances of achieving increased social status.
 This is a particularly frustrating paradox, for in a meritocratic society where the normative
principle holds, an individual seems to have an advantage in securing as much education as he or
she can. However, when many individuals seek additional education, the aggregate effects of this
demand decrease the social status expectations associated with most of the educational levels.
This causes people to demand even more education in the next time period.
 This paradox lends support to a number of results due to the interactions between various
systemic principles such as the Law of Zero Correlation, the Principle of Shifting Benefits and
Liabilities, the Law of Last Entry, and the Principle of the Moving Target. Boudon shows that
when expectations associated with some particular educational level become reduced, a decrease
in expectations at all levels results. (ibid., Table 8.4, 147)
 Boudon sees evidence that this point has been reached at the secondary level in some 
industrial societies, but "it seems that not even the most advanced industrial societies have
achieved a proportion of college students so large that a severe decrease in the expectations at
this level can be observed." (ibid., 150) One wonders whether or not the American educational
system has moved to a point beyond Boudon's claim? Because of their logico-mathematical
nature, the models presented here are generalizable over all systemic levels. Already, over 60%
of the high school graduates enter higher educational institutions (National Center for Education
Statistics, 1994). It may not be long before the system approachs zero correlation at this level!
 Perhaps in anticipation of zero correlation at the college level, Thurow has called for a 
"system of post-secondary education for the non-college bound student" (Thurow, 1994).
However, I suggest that such a "system" (even if established independently of the educational
system) would itself be absorbed into the educational system and therefore be subject to its laws
and thus perpetuate the paradoxes discussed here. Such is the power of the dynamics of the
educational system.(Note 10)
B. Further Observations on Systemic Growth
 While the paradoxes generated by Boudon's model are important for establishing the
boundaries and limitations of educational systems, there are other observations on growth that
warrant exploration.
 Boudon, in his Appendix to Chapter 9, indicates that by manipulating the demand for
education (i.e., predicating demand in the educational system upon exogenous rather than
endogenous factors), equality of educational opportunity (EEO) can be affected. This is the only
alternative, other than changing social stratification, that he offers to remedy IEO and ISO.
 Now, if the number of positions (student slots) in the educational system at the highest
level remains unchanged and if the number of positions at the middle level is increased by D
during time period t to t+1, and if the number of positions at the lowest level is decreased by D
during this same time period -- then, how is the number of persons with lowest social
background T(t ) who reach at least the middle educational level affected by the value of D?
 Boudon concludes on the basis of this "modified" model that T(t) is an increasing function
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of time and an increasing function of D. Furthermore, T(t) increases at a decreasing rate as a
function of process-phase. According to Boudon, the duration's of the three phases are a function
of D ("an increase in D has the effect of shortening the first and second phases..."). Thus
non-linear returns in T(t) are associated with increase in the value of D. This thesis is presented
in expanded form in (Boudon, 1976).
 This "modified" model (reflecting an "ideal-typical planned educational system") results in
a decrease in IEO through the manipulation of demand, while the IEO parameter, "a", remains
constant over time. (This IEO parameter has marked similarities to the meritocratic parameter, ß,
presented in the Aggregate and Individual Utility models.) The free-market endogenous
educational system creates what appear to be insurmountable problems (i.e., the paradoxes).
 On the other hand, the exogenous educational system, permits us in theory at least, to
correct some of these undesirable effects. Boudon rightfully questions the high social costs of
this remedy. Nevertheless, this "modified" model may provide additional insights into the growth
mechanism of the system and may have enormous implications for policy and planning
especially if the demand for education is to be controlled. It deserves further study.
C. A Logistic Growth Curve
 In an intriguing footnote (ibid., 201, ff.3), Boudon suggests that in conjunction with the
paradoxes cited above, there is a particular point in the free-market educational system
development where "growth is more rapid at the higher level than at the secondary level and thus
a decrease in IEO and ISO is curtained." (ibid., 199) This growth, fueled by unrestrained demand
for more education, may lead to a state of "latent crisis." This runaway exponential growth trend
may be checked by a "braking process" that is proportional to the trend, leading to a logistic
rather than an exponential growth curve.
 What are the circumstances that would lead to this braking process and would these
circumstances be endogenous or exogenous to the educational system? The answers to these
questions are fundamental to education policy. These answers appear to be intimately related to
many of the systemic principles in the general theory of educational systems.
 Finally, what is to be made of Boudon's enigmatic statement that "the concern of all 
industrial societies with short-term higher education can be better understood in the light of the
dialectic between the exponential growth of educational demand and the (proportional) braking
process...?" Perhaps the theory of the educational system and the models put forward here can
shed some light on this question.
Notes
1. Originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association
San Francisco, California April 19, 1995 Session 16.36 The Political Context of Educational
Reform (Division G; SIG/Politics of Education). Some of the ideas and models presented here
have appeared in various forms and stages of completion in previous works. In particular:
Thomas F. Green(1997) with David P. Ericson and Robert H. Seidman; Seidman(1982);
Seidman(1981). The analysis of Boudon's work has never been published.
2. This paper uses the high school attainment rate as the measure of systemic "size due to growth
in attainment." One reason is that this is what the Congressional Act focuses on. Another, is that
the 12th grade is the last level of the educational system that is non-selective. For the most part,
one not only chooses to go on to post-secondary education, one is chosen. It is this fact, together
with certain systemic laws, that illustrates the inherent futility of certain education policies at
particular stages of systemic growth.
I use the 17 year-old age-cohort to measure the high school attainment rate. This is the cohort
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used by the National Center for Education Statistics (1995) to track the high school attainment
ratio since 1869. The models presented here are based upon a dichotomized population: those
who have not completed high school and those who have but have not gone on to the
post-secondary level of the system. 
However, some researchers use a different age-cohort. For example, the National Education
Goals Panel uses the 19-20 year-old age cohort (National Education Goals Panel, September
1994). Other studies report high school completion rates amongst various age cohorts, including
21-22 year-olds and even 29-30 year-olds (National Center for Education Statistics, 1993).The
numeric ratios will differ, of course. A standard measure of high school "completion and school
leaving" has been proposed. The "appropriate unit of analysis" is the graduating class
cohort.(Hartzell, 1992).
3. A sample calculation can be found in Appendix C.
4. It is probably unreasonable to apply the model at the lower attainment rates where the power
of the normative principle is very low. However, the model does serve to illustrate the idea that
the relative benefit disparity between the two groups first decreases and then increases. This
phenomenon suggests that a particular educational policy appropriate for one stage of systemic
growth may not be appropriate for another.
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Decenial Census Reports for 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970; Current
Population Reports, P60, nos. 85, 90, 92, 97, 101. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports for 1984, 1987, 1990; P70, nos. 11, 21, 32 ("Educational Background and
Economic Status").
6. See Levin(1972) for a traditional analysis of the relevant data.
7. For an extended analysis from another methodological perspective, see Appendix C in (Green,
1997).
8. See the Table reproduced in Appendix D (National Center for Education Statistics, 1995). It is
interesting to note that the U.S. Government projection of the high school attainment ratio to the
year 2006 keeps it at about 74% (using the 18 year-old cohort). Why? No reason is given. See
Tables 26 and B4 (National Center for Education Statistics, 1996).
9. This irony (in the form of paradoxes) is addressed by Boudon (1974) and is analyzed in Part
VI above. Boudon's models confirm the results of the Aggregate and Individual models.
10. For an example of such an absorption scenario, see Seidman's (1982) analysis of the "lifelong
learning system."
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATIONS OF SECTION E AREA
To calculate Þ, we begin by truncating the asymptotes of the two standardized normal curves
(Figure IV-1) at 3.0 standard deviations above and below their respective means. As a result, we
lose 0.26% of the population of any one curve.
26 of 37
Since the two curves are identical (i.e., both are standardized normal curves), the point on the
X-axis (µ(I) directly below the point of intersection, I) lies midway between the X(Ø) and X(~Ø)
distribution means, µ(Ø) and µ(~Ø), respectively. This follows from the laws of symmetry, since
Section D is always equal to Section A in area. Figure A-1 emphasizes the area of intersection in
Figure IV-1.
Figure A-1. Section E Area Emphasized
(E(Ø) and E(~Ø) correspond to E1 and E2 , respectively, in Table IV-2)
We know by symmetry, that the area to the right of the vertical line Iu(I) to µ(I) on curve X(~Ø)
(i.e., area E(~Ø) is equal to the area to the left of line I to µ(I) on curve X(Ø) (i.e., area E(Ø) ).
Thus, twice E(~Ø) or twice E(Ø) gives us Þ, the area of Section E(Ø) .
Now we can proceed to develop a pair of algorithms that enable us to calculate area E(~Ø).
The area Þ, equals 1.0 when ß equals zero. In this situation, X(~Ø) and X(Ø) are superimposed
one upon the other. Since µ(~Ø) = µ(Ø) , their relative difference, ¶, is equal to the absolute
value of µ(~Ø) - µ(Ø) which is equal to zero. When ß =1.0, area Þ equals zero. In this case,
X(~Ø) and X(Ø) are mutually exclusive and ¶ equals 6.0. Between these two extremes, ß ranges
from zero to 1.0.
We first examine the case where ß ranges from zero to 0.5 and then the case where it ranges from
0.5 to 1.0. (Note that 0.5 is used throughout as an approximation to 0.4987, which is used in the
calculations due to truncation.)
CASE 1: (0 < = ß = > 0.5)
Consider Figure A-2. The relative distance, ¶, between the two means, µ(~Ø) and µ(Ø) , is equal
to the distance on the X-axis under area A (i.e., the area corresponding to the value of ß).
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Figure A-2. Case 1: Where ß Ranges from 0 to 0.5
Note that when ß = 0, the two means, µ(~Ø) and µ(Ø), coincide simply because the two curves,
X(~Ø) and X(Ø) , are superimposed one upon the other. As the value of ß increases, the X(~Ø)
curve is shifted to the left, a distance equal to the distance on the X-axis under Section A. Call
this distance ¶, which is the value of the X(~Ø) curve translation.
Since ¶(2) = 3.0, we need only find ¶(1) in order to find ¶ (i.e., ¶ = ¶(2) - ¶(1) ). Area F is equal to
0.4987 - G and ¶(1) is found from a standardized normal curve table. Once we have computed ¶,
we can locate µ(I) with respect to µ(~Ø) . See Figure A-3.
Figure A-3. The Parameters for Finding ß
Note that µ(I) lies ¶/2 above µ(~Ø) . Area G is found from a standardized normal curve table.
Area E(~Ø) is equal to 0.4987 - G. The area ¶, is simply twice area E(~Ø) . The algorithm for
this computation is shown in Algorithm A-1.
ALGORITHM A-1
CASE 1: WHERE ß RANGES FROM 0 TO 0.5 
(Refer to Figures A-2 and A-3)
 Step
F = 0.4987 - ß1.
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¶(1) from standardized normal curve table2.
¶ = ¶(2) - ¶(1)3.
µ(I) = ¶/2 with respect to µ(~Ø)4.
G from standardized normal curve table5.
E(~Ø) = 0.4987 - G6.
Þ = 2(E(~Ø) )7.
CASE 2: (0.5 < = ß = > 1.0)
Figure A-4 depicts the situation for this case, and the algorithm for the computation of Þ is
shown in Algorithm A-2.
Figure A-4. Case 2: Where ß Ranges from 0.5 to 1.0
ALGORITHM A-2
CASE 2: WHERE ß RANGES FROM 0.5 TO 1.0
(Refer to Figures A-3 & A-4)
 Step
F = ß - 0.49871.
¶(1) from standardized normal curve table2.
¶ = ¶(2) + ¶(1)3.
µ(I) = ¶/2 with respect to µ(~Ø)4.
G from standardized normal curve table5.
E(~Ø) = 0. 4987 - G6.
Þ = 2(E(~Ø) )7.
Table A-1, gives the values of Þ for ß values in steps of 0.l. Table A-2 gives the intermediate
values of F, ¶(1) , ¶, µ(I) , G, µ(~Ø) for ß values in steps of 0.1.
Table A-1
VALUES OF Þ AS A FUNCTION OF ß
ß Þ
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0 1.0000
0.10 0.3872
0.20 0.2776
0.30 0.2124
0.40 0.1666
0.50 0.1310
0.60 0.1006
0.70 0.0750
0.80 0.0516
0.90 0.0294
0.95 0.0172
1.00 0
Table A-2
INTERMEDIATE VALUES FROM ALGORITHMS A-1 and A-2
ß F ¶(1) ¶ µ(I) G E(~Ø)
0 . . 0 . . .
0.10 0.3987 1.275 1.725 0.8625 0.3051 0.1936
0.20 0.2987 0.835 2.165 1.0825 0.3599 0.1388
0.30 0.1987 0.520 2.480 1.2400 0.3925 0.1062
0.40 0.0987 0.250 2.750 1.3750 0.4154 0.0833
0.50 0 0 3.000 1.5000 0.4332 0.0655
0.60 0.1013 0.255 3.255 1.6275 0.4484 0.0503
0.70 0.2013 0.530 3.530 1.7650 0.4612 0.0375
0.80 0.3013 0.850 3.850 1.9250 0.4729 0.0258
0.90 0.4013 1.290 4.290 2.1450 0.4840 0.0147
0.95 0.4513 1.660 4.660 2.3300 0.4901 0.0086
1 . . 6.000 . . .
APPENDIX B
MEAN/MEDIAN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBABILISTIC UTILITY MODEL
We can set the Model in motion. See Figure B-1. Note that when ß = 0, the following equalities
hold:
µ(B) = µ(C) = µ(I) = µ(~Ø) = µ(Ø)1.
Absolute value of (µ(A) - µ(I)) = absolute value of (µ(D) - µ(I))2.
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When ß = 1, another set of equalities hold:
µ(C) = µ(B) = µ(I)3.
µ(A) = µ(~Ø)4.
µ(D) = µ(~Ø)5.
Absolute value of (µ(A) - µ(I)) = absolute value of (µ(D) - µ(I))6.
Between these two extremes, it is possible to calculate the relative differences between medians
(µ(Ø) and µ(~Ø) are the grand means and grand medians of their respective distributions) of the
various sections of the two curves shown in Figure B-1.
Figure B-1. Medians/Means for Sections of Curves
Assume that µ(Ø) remains constant and that both curves retain their normal shapes as the size of
Ø (and concomitantly, ~Ø) and ß change. We take µ(Ø) as our point of reference, since it
remains constant, and calculate the other medians with respect to it.
1. Schema's for Median Calculations for Changing Values of ß
We begin, as we did in Appendix A, by truncating the asymptotes of the two standardized normal
curves at 3.0 standard deviations above and below their respective means. Medians µ(A) and
µ(B) have already been calculated in the Aggregate Model and can be found in columns 2 and 3
of Table III-1.
µ(~Ø) is the distance on the X-axis under Section A. This distance is the ¶ value computed as an
intermediate step by Algorithms 1 and 2. See Table A-2. µ(I) is simply one half µ(~Ø) and is also
computed as an intermediate step by Algorithms 1 and 2. See Table A-2.
We now develop schemas that compute the values of µ(C) and µ(D) , for changing values of ß.
Due to the symmetry of the two curves and the equality of Sections A and D, median µ(C) will
always be as much to the right of µ(~Ø) as µ(B) is to the left of µ(Ø) . Thus,
(7) µ(C) = µ(~Ø) - µ(B). (7)
In a similar fashion, µ(D) will always be as much to the left of µ(~Ø) as µ(A) is to the right of
µ(Ø) . Thus,
(8) µ(D) = µ(~Ø) - µ(A). (8)
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Table B-1 displays the results of these computations.
2. Changing Means (µ(Ø) and µ(~Ø) ) With Changing Ø and Constant ß.
We have assumed throughout that the size of Ø has no effect on the means of the dichotomized
populations. Furthermore, for computational purposes, we have assumed that only µ(~Ø) was
affected by changing ß and that µ(Ø) remains permanently anchored.
It is not unreasonable to assume that both means change with changing Ø and that both means
change with changing ß. However, both of these cases reduce to the analysis that has already
been performed for the probability distributions generated by the formulae in Table IV-2
(constant µ(Ø) for changing Ø and changing ß).
Table B-1
INTERMEDIATE VALUES FROM ALGORITHMS 1 AND 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ß µ(Ø) µ(A) µ(B) µ(I) µ(C) µ(~Ø) µ(D)
0 0 3.0 0 0 0 0 -3.0
0.10 0 1.645 -0.126 -0.8625 -1.5990 -1.725 -3.370
0.20 0 1.283 -0.253 -1.0825 -1.9120 -2.165 -3.448
0.30 0 1.037 -0.385 -1.2400 -2.0950 -2.480 -3.517
0.40 0 0.842 -0.524 -1.3750 -2.2260 -2.750 -3.592
0.50 0 0.675 -0.675 -1.5000 -2.3250 -3.000 -3.675
0.60 0 0.524 -0.842 -1.6275 -2.4130 -3.255 -3.779
0.70 0 0.385 -1.037 -1.7650 -2.4930 -3.530 -3.915
0.80 0 0.253 -1.283 -1.9250 -2.5670 -3.850 -4.103
0.90 0 0.126 -1.645 -2.1450 -2.6450 -4.290 -4.416
0.95 0 0.063 -1.960 -2.3300 -2.7000 -4.660 -4.723
1.0 0 0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -6.0 -6.0
To construct the probability tables for changing means, we can use the probability distributions
generated by the formulae in Table IV-2. We need only know the sizes of Ø and ß, and the
relative difference between the two dichotomized population means (see Appendix A). This
relative difference, absolute value of µ(Ø) - µ(~Ø) , is a function only of the size of ß. Thus, if
both means change with changing Ø and with changing ß, and if we know the relative difference
between the means, we can calculate the new ß. We can then consult the existing probability
tables produced by the formulae in Table IV-2.
3. Non-normal Distributions with Equal and Unequal Ranges
The same sort of mean/median and probability analyses that have been performed for normal
distributions can be performed for non-normal distributions. One must, however, first derive the
formulae for the various curves and utilize the calculus to obtain the areas in questions and their
shifting means and medians. The mathematics involved in this kind of analysis is more complex.
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APPENDIX C 
A SAMPLE CALCULATION FOR THE AGGREGATE MODEL
Here is a sample calculation of the median value of the social benefits for high school attainers
and non-attainers.
Suppose that the attainment ratio stands at 30 percent. See Figure C-1. We know that the attainer
group monopolizes the social benefits ranging in value from 0.52 to 3.9 standard deviations from
the grand mean.
The median benefit for this group is thus µ(Ø) = 1.037 standard deviations. This is the point
under the Ø portion of the total distribution where half of the high school attainers (i.e., 15
percent) lie to the right and where the other half lie to the left.
The median social benefits for the remaining 70 percent of the total population (i.e., the
non-attainer group) is µ(~Ø) = -0.385 . This is the point under the Ø portion of the total
distribution where one half of the high school non-attainers (i.e., 35 percent) lie to the right and
the other half lie to the left.
The median social benefit values are derived from the standardized normal distribution, which
represents a particular normal distribution of social benefits. If it turns out that, for this particular
normal distribution, the median of the total distribution is $8,000 with a standard deviation of
$2,500, we can easily calculate the medians (in dollars) of the attainer and non-attainer groups.
Attainer Group Median: $10,593 = $8,000 + (1.037 x $2,500); non-Attainer Group Median:
$7,038 = $8,000 + (-0.385 x $2,500).
Figure C-1. Standardized Normal Curve for the Distribution of Social Benefits
( Ø= high school attainment ratio; ~Ø= non-attainment ratio; grand median=0; µ(Ø) = median
social benefit for attainer group; µ(~Ø)= median social benefit for non-attainer group; standard
deviation = 1)
It is probably unreasonable to apply the model at the lower attainment ratios where the power of
the normative principle is very low. However, the model does serve to illustrate the idea that the
relative benefit disparity between the two groups first decreases and then increases. This
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phenomenon suggests that a particular education policy appropriate for one stage of systemic
growth might not be appropriate for another stage.
Appendix D
Empirical High School Attainment Data*
School Year
Graduates as
Percent of
17-year-old
Population
1869-70 2.0
1879-80 2.5
1889-90 3.5
1899-00 6.4
1909-10 8.8
1919-20 16.8
1929-30 29.0
1939-40 50.8
1947-48 52.6
1949-50 59.0
1951-52 57.4
1953-54 59.8
1955-56 63.1
1956-57 63.1
1957-58 64.8
1958-59 66.2
1959-60 69.5
1960-61 67.9
1961-62 69.3
1962-63 70.9
34 of 37
1963-64 76.7
1964-65 72.1
1965-66 76.4
1966-67 76.3
1967-68 76.3
1968-69 77.1
1969-70 76.9
1970-71 75.9
1971-72 75.6
1972-73 75.0
1973-74 74.4
1974-75 73.6
1975-76 73.7
1976-77 73.8
1977-78 73.0
1978-79 71.7
1979-80 71.4
1980-81 71.7
1981-82 72.4
1982-83 72.9
1983-84 73.1
1984-85 72.4
1985-86 72.0
1986-87 71.8
1987-88 72.1
1988-89 71.0
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1989-90 72.4
1990-91 73.2
1991-92 73.1
1992-93 73.2
1993-94 73.1
* National Center for Education Statistics (1995). Table 98 in Digest of Education Statistics.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Addendum January 2, 2001
Appendix D Empirical High School Attainment Data*
School Year Graduates as a percent
of 17-year-old population
1990-1 73.2
1991-2 73.2
1992-3 72.2
1993-4 71.7
1994-5 70.7
1995-6 69.8
1996-7 69.1
1997-8 68.9
1998-9 70.6
* National Center for Education Statistics (1999). 
Digest of Education Statistics. Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office. Table 104
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2000/digest99/d99t104.html
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